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On an early morning in Washington, D.C., Paul Ludwig and his young son stand in a
queue for tickets to the Washington Monument. Bored and without any alternative, they
find themselves talking to a family from Utah. The conversation grows “animated and
heartfelt,” lasting for the entire two hours they pass together in line. They do not
exchange addresses or become personal friends, but, Ludwig observes, if the Utah
family had needed help, he would have helped them. Why? Modern social theories
might attribute this impulse to common humanity or morality, perhaps noting their
shared interest in patriotic monuments. Yet Ludwig finds these answers inadequate.
Something else transpired among these strangers. “The Utah people,” Ludwig asserts,
were his civic friends. “Friends share something” and they “shared a love of the political
system, the regime” a love they did not share, “or not in the same way,” with the “foreign
tourists” around them.
Civic friendship, as Ludwig illustrates with this story, is not a “pie-in-the-sky ideal”
(xiv) unobtainable in these disenchanted times. Rather, civic friends are among us,
standing in lines to cast ballots or at the DMV, at school board hearings or union
meetings, political rallies and outdoor café tables. Civic friendship has persisted even
while modern theories of politics have insisted that each of us is a self-interested
individual. The narrow modern view of human nature misses how we still associate and
not just for self-interested reasons. We enjoy sharing our lives with others and in doing
so we come to identify with groups larger than ourselves. We’re proud of our union
membership or the state where we were born. And when these groups are challenged
or questioned, we react with anger, defending them beyond what our particular selfinterest requires.
But as the story also suggests, we’re not all civic friends. Civic friends share
something in particular, a commitment to their own political community. We must live
together. Civic friendship requires and reinforces the boundaries dividing political
communities and it may exacerbate the conflicts among these. Thus while civic
friendship can “bridge . . . other forms of self-expansion, including morality,” crossing
divides of civic identification would be a bridge too far.
To develop his account of civic friendship, Ludwig pursues a “dialogue with
Aristotle” (xiv). “Civic friendship” translates politikê philia, which Aristotle introduces in
the Nicomachean Ethics to describe homonoia, concord or like-mindedness (1167b1).
Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe translate politikê philia as “friendship among
citizens.” Ludwig criticizes the translation “political friendship” for having “amoral
connotations.” Although he admits that “civic friendship” is “off-putting, dull, and staid,”
he retains it, ostensibly because while the term does not presuppose moral virtue, it
points to it more than “political.”
“Civic friendship,” on Ludwig’s account, emerges from friendship born of
instrumentality to become something more. For Aristotle, all common activity involves
friendship and every common activity involves some good. The type of good friends
share determines the kind of friendship. Although today we tend to restrict friendship to
intimate connection where each friend loves the other’s goodness, Aristotle insists that

friends can emerge from shared usefulness or shared pleasure, which while not “simply
good” are often what we mean when we speak of goods. Civic friendship is one such
kind of friendship. It grows up around shared utility: we appreciate and admire the
helpful neighbor or solicitous postal worker; these relationships, for Aristotle, are a kind
of friendship, not true or perfect friendship, but friendship “by analogy” (11).
Civic friendship was crucial to economic exchange; more complicated
transactions, involving, say, the extension of credit, required the trust that friendship
sustained. In antiquity, civic benefactors who sponsored festivals or other public goods
also acted out of friendship; their rewards came in the form of honor and public
recognition, analogues of the love that inspirits a true friendship.
Ludwig’s emphasis on the thumotic dimension of friendship emphasizes an often
unnoticed aspect of Aristotle’s theory. “Love is dependent on our capacities for anger
and self-assertion,” Ludwig asserts; “Aristotelian friendships” are “darker” than most
interpreters have recognized (26). All friendships “are best thought of as negative
associations, flights from enemies and evils rather than attraction to goods” (31). Ludwig
grounds this argument in a reading of Plato’s Lysis and moments in Plato’s Republic.
He then turns to Aristotle’s Politics 7 to elaborate how “it is spiritedness [thumos] that
makes people affectionate [philia]” (1327b38-1328a17). Contrary to the argument of the
Republic, Aristotle suggests that this spiritedness is harsher towards insiders than
outsiders: “those who have loved excessively will hate excessively too” (46). Drawing on
brief excursuses into other works of Aristotle, Ludwig makes the case for “irascible
friendship.” Calmed-down (“complacent”) thumos is philia; a slight against the friend
pricks thumos into angry reaction. “Affectionate love,” Ludwig concludes, “contains the
seeds of its own downfall” because of a “struggle between two sides of friendly passion:
quiescence and esteem.” The “dark side” of friendship surfaces when the dignity and
identity held in friendly relation are challenged.
The “dark side of friendship” speaks to contemporary debates about identity
politics. Friendly passion and passionate solidarity become defensive because they
both involve self-esteem and the desire for the esteem of others. Friendship is irascible,
easily provoked into angry reaction. While Hegel recognized this “negative orientation,”
many liberal theorists overlook or disavow it, meaning liberalism is ill-equipped to
accommodate irascible friendship. Rather than seeking to expand concord and political
friendship, moderns like James Madison have sought to “divide and rule” (68). Yet this
only exacerbates thumotic reactions. Instead, Ludwig suggests, the identity of “citizen”
needs promotion – and with it the attribution of dignity and honor to this category.
Ludwig’s interpretation of Aristotle’s irascible friendship thus sets up the problem
for contemporary liberalism that Rediscovering Civic Friendship seeks to address: how
to promote popular identification of “citizenness”? According to Ludwig, a first step
involves recognizing the degree to which civic friendship continues to exist in civil
society. What Alexis de Tocqueville called “associations” persist and models of selfinterested individuals ignore or exclude the ways “we are always already involved in
loving others” (139). Civic friendship’s persistence challenges the way social scientists
think about collective action problems. Two observable phenomena point to civic
friendship’s relevance: our disgust at free riders and our desire for the approval of
others. “What is actually going on” (159), Ludwig asserts, is neither pure self-interest
nor pure charity. The work of friendship is already keeping the polity together.

But the polity is not working as well as it might, leading Ludwig to ask how social
policy could support a civil society marked by civic friendship. Ludwig offers a series of
proposals to strengthen civic friendship and improve contemporary liberal democracies.
Starting from Tocqueville’s insight into the “secondary powers” of associations –
townships, cities, and counties as well as voluntary political, civic, and small private
associations – Ludwig suggests that governments should support these groups while
also letting them do their work without direct intervention. “Devolution of powers and
subsidiarity” (182) frame Ludwig’s recommendations, “scatter[ing] power,” in
Tocqueville’s phrase, to interest more people in public things (186).
Social policy can also promote the equality upon which civic friendship depends.
Ludwig emphasizes that efforts here must respect how property and exchange are the
basis of friendship; the pride, esteem, and honor accrued in the commercial realm
matter through friendly relationships. This means that policies should support reciprocity
rather than “leveling” (227) – preserving relationships equal enough to preclude
domination or exploitation but not so equal as to obviate differential social recognition.
What Jill Frank calls “a democracy of distinction” might ensue, one where conflict is
mediated by friendship.
Building on Aristotle, Ludwig propounds a “middling regime of civic friendship”
(237) where a strong middle class predominates, lessening unhealthy divisions between
rich and poor and promoting a middle-class morality of equality. Although this morality is
not fully ethical, virtue can still be a concern; it just does not entitle the virtuous person
to rule. Concord (homonoia) becomes practical in such a regime, which also
suppresses destructive manifestations of thumos such as envy and covetousness. But
concord is more than the absence of unmediated conflict; it rests in “basic agreement”
about a regime. Civic friendship promotes “enough solidarity” for political coherence;
this in turn requires some civic education (paideia) that can shape citizens’ attachments.
Although today’s liberal democracies do not speak of paideia like Aristotle’s Greeks,
Ludwig notes that they still promote “love of equality and freedom” (284).
Civic friendship makes equality into a goal to be admired. It thus initiates a
positive feedback loop wherein equality leads to equality. Many of Ludwig’s specific
policy proposals speak to this phenomenon: encouraging reciprocity in patronage and
commerce, for example, can build civic friendship and thus the shared identity of
citizens. National service, which Ludwig also endorses, would have a similar function.
Yet the “dark side” of friendship is not restricted to what Ludwig names. The
context of Aristotle’s discussion of thumos and philia suggests a greater issue that
haunts Ludwig’s book from the outset. Aristotle introduces these observations after his
discussions of how nations living in cold regions and those of Europe are full of thumos
while “Asiatic nations” lack thumos. The Greeks occupy the middle position, having just
the right measure of thumos, allowing them to live under the best political regime and
continue to be free. Whether or not Aristotle intends to approve the biological
determinism of these observations, they call attention to the boundaries of the nation
that enclose civic friendship, boundaries that Ludwig highlights with his mention of the
“foreign tourists” at the Washington Monument who could not be his civic friends (or at
least “not in the same way”). Civic friendship is partial and does not admit outsiders.
Does this civic friendship encourage ethnonationalism? In his discussion of immigration,
Ludwig admits that distinguishing “race-based cultural supremacy” from “constitutional

(regime-based) likemindedness” (312) is difficult. Civic friendship is often mistaken for
nativism. But aside from calling for more “scholarly scrutiny,” Ludwig does not explain
how the production of like-mindedness can avoid the forms of violence with which it has
long associated – nativism, yes, but also settler colonialism, racism, and many other
forms of oppression.
The differences between the liberal state in which Ludwig encloses civic
friendship and the democratic polis in which Aristotle theorizes philia are important here.
Aristotle’s own status as a resident foreigner in Athens may well have helped him
conceptualize how anyone, regardless of citizenship status, could practice philia and,
indeed, even excellent friendships. But perhaps more important, the politics of this
friendship were democratic more than liberal. Friendship instantiated equality and
provided the basis for political freedom; friendship thus challenged the very boundaries
demarcating friend and enemy, citizen and non-citizen. “Political friendship,” the
translation I’d prefer, expands the very notion of the political as it enlarges the circle of
those with whom one is friendly. Ludwig’s desire to rescue liberalism from itself by
showing the real work of civic friendship may have the result of affirming the fugitive
democracy upon which liberalism has long been parasitic – and thus illuminating a path
forward for greater solidarity and cooperation not just with “Utah people” but with those
apparent “foreign tourists” too.
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